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Abstract
Deep neural networks are being widely deployed for many critical tasks due to their
high classification accuracy. In many cases, pre-trained models are sourced from
vendors who may have disrupted the training pipeline to insert Trojan behaviors
into the models. These malicious behaviors can be triggered at the adversary’s will
and hence, cause a serious threat to the widespread deployment of deep models. We
propose a method to verify if a pre-trained model is Trojaned or benign. Our method
captures fingerprints of neural networks in the form of adversarial perturbations
learned from the network gradients. Inserting backdoors into a network alters its
decision boundaries which are effectively encoded in their adversarial perturbations.
We train a two stream network for Trojan detection from its global (L∞ and
L2 bounded) perturbations and the localized region of high energy within each
perturbation. The former encodes decision boundaries of the network and latter
encodes the unknown trigger shape. We also propose an anomaly detection method
to identify the target class in a Trojaned network. Our methods are invariant to
the trigger type, trigger size, training data and network architecture. We evaluate
our methods on MNIST, NIST-Round0 and NIST-Round1 datasets, with up to
1,000 pre-trained models making this the largest study to date on Trojaned network
detection, and achieve over 92% detection accuracy to set the new state-of-the-art.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are the main driving force behind the current success of Artificial
Intelligence. However, training DNN models requires enormous amounts of data and computational
resources. Hence, many users prefer to source and deploy pre-trained models in their, often security
critical, applications such as drug discovery [1, 2], facial recognition [3], autonomous driving [4],
surveillance [5]. It is well known that DNNs easily learn any bias that is present in the training
data. Vendors of DNN models, with malicious intentions, can exploit this vulnerability of DNNs and
intentionally inject Trojan behavior into the network during the training process. This is generally
achieved by inserting a trigger into some of the samples and then training the DNN to exhibit
malicious behavior for data that contains the trigger and normal behavior for data without the trigger.
With full control over the DNN training process, the adversary is able to choose any trigger shape.
Triggers are chosen such that they do not appear suspicious to the human observer e.g. a yellow
rectangular sticker on a stop sign can be used to trigger a DNN to classify it as a speed limit sign.
Since only the adversaries have knowledge of the trigger, they can initiate malicious behaviour at will
and with no knowledge of the trigger, users of pre-trained models may not even suspect the presence
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of backdoors. This causes a serious threat to the widespread deployment of pre-trained models. Note
that attacking Trojaned DNNs is much easier and different than adversarial attacks on clean DNNs,
since the former has access to the DNN training process itself, while the latter only exploits intrinsic
vulnerabilities of neural networks [6].
Given that noise-based adversarial attacks are inherent to CNN models, it is no surprise that trigger-
based Trojan attacks also exist [7, 8]. Trojans are generally inserted into the deep model during
training or transfer learning [9, 10, 11, 12]. A backdoor is typically inserted into a network [13] to
make the CNNs mis-classify some specific class or classes. Instead of training a model with a dataset
poisoned with triggers, another possible way the adversary can Trojan a network is by modifying the
weights of selected neurons so that the model responds maliciously to a specific trigger [10].
Current challenges for Trojan (backdoor) detection in practice are: 1) Lack of a deep learning-based
model trained on a large-scale dataset for Trojan detection; 2) Unavailability of trigger information
for a suspected Trojan infected model; usually only limited training data of clean samples is available;
3) Very limited information which can be obtained from the query model predictions since the test
accuracy for Trojaned DNNs is normal for clean inputs, and 4) The target class in the infected model
is unknown, and it is computationally expensive to search all possible targeted attacks when the
output labels are in the hundreds.
To address these challenges, we propose the first deep learning based Trojan Detection Network
(TDN). Our method has two stages, the first one is a two stream neural network that outputs the
probability of a model containing a Trojan, and the second stage predicts the target class in a Trojaned
model. Our contributions are summarized as follows. First, we propose a deep neural network for
Trojan detection from only a few clean samples. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use
a DNN classifier, trained on a large scale dataset of benign and Trojaned models, for Trojan detection.
Second, we propose a method for target class prediction in a Trojaned model. We introduce a new
variable (γ) that quantifies the difficulty of attacking a model. This variable is a critical indicator for
the target class of a Trojan infected model.
Theoretical Justification: Inserting Trojan behaviour into a network essentially puts an additional
constraint on the model optimization during the training process. The model must learn to exhibit
normal behavior and achieve an expected high classification accuracy on clean training/validation
samples but exhibit the chosen malicious behaviour on samples containing a trigger, a localized
pattern. This has two important consequences. Firstly, the decision boundaries of the model must
adjust to allow such a behavior. Secondly, the model must become more responsive to local patterns
(the trigger). Our hypothesis is that if we can encode these two aspects, we will be able to detect
Trojaned models accurately. For the former, we use universal adversarial perturbations [14] which,
being image agnostic, reasonably capture a fingerprint of the decision boundaries. For the latter, we
look for a localized region of high energy in the adversarial perturbation. Thirdly, we also hypothesize
that Trojaned models are easier to fool with minimal universal perturbation energy compared to clean
models. Our proposed method basically capitalizes on these three factors to detect Trojaned networks
and the target class of such networks.
2 Related Work
Adversarial attacks on CNNs have focused on the phenomenon of noise-based adversarial exam-
ples [15, 16], which are visually almost indistinct from the original images, but can mislead DNN
classifiers into making incorrect predictions. Even universal adversarial perturbations [14] have been
discovered that are image agnostic and when added to any image of any class, can cause the DNN to
mis-classify them. By computing singular vectors of the Jacobian matrices of hidden layers, universal
perturbations can be constructed with very few images [17]. Adversarial attacks generally do not
assume access to the training process of deep models. A comprehensive survey of such method is
reported in [6]. In this paper, we focus on defending against Trojan attacks where the attacker disrupts
the training pipeline of the DNN to insert a backdoor.
The risk of Trojan models arises when the training process of a DNN is outsourced or a pre-trained
model from an untrusted source is deployed. This security risk was first investigated in Badnets[13].
It was shown that backdoors in networks infected with Trojans can remain a threat even after
transfer learning. Chen et al. [12] proposed a backdoor attack algorithm that uses poisoned data
to contaminate the CNN model. Trojaning attack [10] introduced a way to generate triggers and
maximize the activation of some specific neurons to insert a backdoor. The embedded backdoors are
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stealthy and the unexpected malicious behavior is activated only by triggers, making them extremely
challenging to detect with only clean data samples.
Defense methods were first developed to detect adversarial images [18, 19, 7, 20, 21, 22]. Metzen et
al. [23] detect adversarial perturbations with a target classification network. Feinman et al. [24] also
use a binary classifier to detect adversarial perturbations. Magnet [25] trains a classifier on manifolds
of normal examples to discriminate adversarial perturbations without any prior knowledge of the
attack. Safetynet [26] is designed to detect adversarial-noise based attacks and exploits the different
adversarial perturbations produced to train a SVM classifier.
Methods for detecting and defending against Trojan attacks have also been proposed. Liu et al. [27]
proposed a pruning and fine-tuning procedure to suppress backdoor attacks. Chen et al. [28] proposed
Activation Clustering methodology for detecting and removing backdoors from DNNs. SentiNet[29]
uses the behavior of adversarial misclassification of poisoned networks to detect an attack. However,
all these methods fail in the realistic settings where access to poisoned data is not available. Neural
Cleanse [30] was the first method to detect Trojan infected models with clean samples by reverse
engineering the trigger. They employ the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) technique to compute
the anomaly in the L1 norm of the reversed triggers to detect Trojaned models. However, the trigger
must be reverse engineered for each class, which is not scalable in practice for DNNs with hundreds
and thousands of classes. DeepInspect [31] uses conditional GAN to reconstruct trigger patterns for
Trojan detection. NeuronInspect [32] detects backdoor from the output features, such as sparsity,
smoothness, and persistence of saliency maps obtained from back-propagation of the confidence
scores. Tabor [33] propose metrics to measure the quality of reversed triggers and achieve improved
performance than Neural Cleanse by introducing several regularization terms to refine the generated
triggers.
The above methods [30, 31, 32] are sub-optimal because they are not learning-based and employ
the MAD technique and manually tuned anomaly thresholds to detect the outliers of reverse engi-
neered triggers. More importantly, none of these techniques report results on large scale data of
benign/Trojaned models and none of them can predict the target class of a Trojaned model. To
address these challenges, we propose Cassandra, a Trojan detection method that exploits universal
adversarial perturbations [17] generated from a very limited number of clean samples. Given their
image-agnostic nature, we compute universal adversarial perturbations for a batch of clean samples,
where the batches could be as few as 5. Note that this holds even if the number of classes is in
thousands, unlike prior work such as Neural Cleanse, where one perturbation per class is necessary.
Our method also provides the target class of a Trojan infected model.
3 Detecting Trojan Infected Models
During training, a neural network simultaneously learns feature representation and decision bound-
aries that partition the feature vector space into the respective classes. When an adversary inserts a
backdoor into a network, the decision boundaries are altered. Our hypothesis is that Trojan infected
networks exhibit decision boundaries that are different from typical, benign classification networks.
Our approach exploits this fact by retrieving the fingerprints of the decision boundaries of a network,
and subsequently trains a classifier on these fingerprints to classify a query network as benign or
Trojan infected. We use adversarial perturbations to retrieve fingerprints of the decision boundaries
of the query network. In contrast to image specific perturbations, universal perturbations [14] are
image agnostic, such that the generated perturbations when added to any input image sends it across
the decision boundary to change its label. The success of universal perturbations is measured by its
fooling rate, the proportion of images that are successfully mis-classified after the perturbation is
added. Since universal adversarial perturbations capture the geometry of the decision boundaries [14],
the perturbations for benign and Trojan models are expected to be significantly different in character.
3.1 Fingerprinting Decision Boundaries with Adversarial Perturbations
We formulate Trojan detection as a classification problem. For a query neural network model, f , we
define a Trojan detection classifier F as
F (4x(f), E(4x(f)), η(f)) =
{
0 for benign model
1 for Trojan infected model. (1)
Here f outputs a prediction y for each input image x, drawn from the distribution µ of images in
Rd, η(f) is fooling rate and E(4x(f)) is the perturbation energy. Similarly, fˆ and yˆ denote the
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Figure 1: (a) and (b) illustrate how decision boundaries can change after inserting a Trojan in a
network. The Trojaned model (b) has a complicated decision boundary after being compromised.
Introducing triggers in the training data changes the decision boundary of model (b) to accommodate
the poisoned samples. This makes it easier to perturb the class label of a sample from class A to
B (shown by arrows) since the distance across decision boundary is smaller compared to in (a).
(c) Shows universal adversarial perturbations computed using L∞ (top row) and L2 norm (bottom
row) for benign and Trojaned models. Models from left to right: Trojaned Inception-v3, Trojaned
DenseNet-121, benign ResNet50, and benign DenseNet121.
Trojaned classifier and corresponding prediction for x. For a desired threshold δ, we obtain universal
perturbations4x and4xˆ for classifiers f and fˆ , respectively, such that the following holds:
P
x∼µ{f(x+4x) 6= y} ≥ 1− δ and Px∼µ{fˆ(x+4xˆ) 6= yˆ} ≥ 1− δ , (2)
Note that the observed fooling rate η can go much higher than 1−δ during the generation of universal
adversarial perturbations. We define the perturbation energy E as:
E = ‖4x‖1 = ‖h(x)‖1 , (3)
where h is parameterized by the process that generates the perturbations. Let E4BA denote the
perturbation energy cost to transform all data samples from class B to class A across the decision
boundary for a benign model, and vice versa for E4AB . Similarly, E4A′B′ and E4B′A′ denote the
same for a Trojan infected model. In an infected model the decision boundary is changed such that
some backdoors are created close to other classes. Due to these changes in the decision boundary,
E4A′B′ < E4AB and E4B′A′ < E4BA for a given fooling rate (see Fig. 1a,b), where 4AB is
proportional to E4AB and so on.
We define the notion of attack difficulty for both universal perturbations and targeted attacks as
γ = E/S, (4)
where S is the fooling rate (η) for universal perturbations and attack success rate for targeted attacks.
Universal adversarial perturbations of clean and Trojan infected models are distinguishable above a
given fooling rate η, both visually and in terms of energy, as shown in Figure 1c.
4 Trojan Detector
Figure 2 shows the schematic overview of our proposed Trojan detector, referred to as Cassandra. The
query network, along with the clean labelled training data, are used to generate two types of universal
perturbations i.e. those bounded by L∞ and L2 norms. Note that we do not assume the presence of
triggered images in the training data, since triggers are unknown in a realistic scenario. The L∞
universal perturbations are fed to one stream of the network together with their corresponding attack
difficulty, γ∞. Similarly, the L2 norm bounded universal perturbations and their attack difficulty, γ2,
are fed to the second stream of the trojan detection network. The feature extractor in Fig. 2 extracts
distinguish features from the bounded perturbations of each stream. The two feature extractors
have identical architectures, but have different sets of weights. Outputs from the two streams are
concatenated and used to train the Trojan classifier with binary cross-entropy loss.
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Figure 2: Trojan Detection: Features extracted from universal adversarial perturbations are used
to fingerprint the query model. A two stream architecture is used with L2 and L∞ norm bounded
perturbations. The two feature extractor modules have identical architectures, but don’t share weights.
Three sets of features characterizing the query model are extracted: features to represent the maximum
energy window in the perturbation extracted by a 5 layer MLP, CNN embedding from the perturbation
image, using a MobileNetv3 network and the attack difficulty (γ) of the generated perturbation.
Features from the two streams are concatenated and passed to the fully connected classification layer.
Perturbation Generator: Since the target class of the (potentially Trojan infected) query net-
work is unknown, the universal adversarial perturbations (Eq. 2) [14] are computed that cause
mis-classification of any input image. The DeepFool [34] kernel is used for perturbation generation.
A batch of training images are passed to the query network, the direction of the nearest decision
boundary is computed which is back-propagated to compute a small L∞ or L2 bounded perturbation
for the input. By iteratively refining the perturbation over different mini-batches, a universal (image
agnostic) adversarial perturbation is obtained. The generated perturbations are sent to their respective
feature extractor stream for further processing. In our case, we stop the iterations when a certain
threshold 1 − δ is achieved by the universal perturbation or a maximum number of iterations are
reached.
Feature Extractor contains two parallel modules. The first one (top right in Fig. 2) is a Multi Layer
Perceptron (MLP), which crops a 50× 50 window from the perturbation image (after conversion to
grayscale) and outputs a 256 dimensional feature vector. The MLP layers have 2500, 3126, 2048,
1024, 512 and 256 neurons, respectively. A sliding window is moved over the grayscale perturbation
and the location which has the maximum L1 norm is selected as input to the MLP. The second module
(bottom right in Fig. 2) comprises of a MobilenetV3-Large CNN [35] pre-trained on ImageNet
classification. The 1280-dimensional embedding output from the penultimate layer is used as a
feature for the Trojan classifier. The network has a total of 5.5M trainable parameters.
Trojan Classifier: The output of each feature extractor module is a concatenation of the MLP
features (256-D), CNN features (1280-D) and the attack difficulty (1-D). This totals to a 1537-D
vector. The outputs of the two-streams (L∞ and L2 perturbations) are concatenated to form a 3,074-D
vector that is fed to the Trojan classifier, which is a simple fully connected layer. The probability of
the query model being Trojan infected is obtained by applying the sigmoid activation to the output.
To fully capture properties of the complex decision boundaries, we divide the training data into 10
batches and obtain 10 probabilities for each query model. The final score is computed as the mean
value of these 10 probabilities.
5 Target Class Prediction
We propose targeted attack difficulty, as a metric for outlier class prediction in a Torjan infected
model. An outlier class is the one which is easy to launch a targeted attack against, compared to the
other classes, and hence most likely to be the target class of the Trojan infected model.
Attack difficulty is defined as γ = E/S, where E is the perturbation energy (Eq. 3) and S is the
attack success rate for the targeted attack i.e. the proportion of images whose predictions change to
target labels. Attack difficulty (or its reciprocal attack efficiency) measures the perturbation energy
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Figure 3: Target class prediction: The L1 norm (left) and attack difficulty (L1 Norm/Success
Rate) (right) of FGSM adversarial perturbations computed per label for benign and Trojan infected
networks. The true target class is 0, detected outlier in each case is encircled.
normalized by the success rate of the attack. Given a query model, we use the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [36], given its fast execution time, to compute adversarial perturbations for each
class. For example, NIST-Round0 data contains five class labels and the Trojan models classify
triggered images of any class to class 0. In this case, class 0 is the target class and the attack is
called an "any-to-one" targeted attack. Fig. 3 shows that the proposed attack difficulty is able to
correctly detect the target class of the Trojan attack as outlier, but L1 norm used for Trojaned model
detection in Neural Cleanse [30] fails. We finalize our target class prediction with a two stage method.
The first stage is our Trojan detection network which outputs the probability of the model being
infected with a Trojan, and the second stage is outlier detection based on Median Absolute Deviation
(MAD) [37, 30] for predicting the target class. The anomaly index for outlier detection is defined as
the absolute deviation of the data points from their median and then normalized by the median, to
measure the dispersion of the data distribution. For Trojaned models, the second stage selects the
label with anomaly index value above a threshold as the predicted target class.
6 Experiments
For all experiments, we perform 5-fold cross validation and report average results. In Eqn. 2, δ is
set to 0.2 to quantify the desired fooling rate. We use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of
0.001.The constant estimator for the MAD outlier detector is 1.4826, so that any data sample with
anomaly index larger than 2 has > 95% probability of being an outlier. We employ anomaly index
threshold of 2, such that the class labels with anomaly index larger than 2 are considered the target
class. For training we use a server with 6 Nvidia RTX 2080 Ti GPUs. Perturbation generation and
training for NIST-Round1 data takes around 12 hours. Inference for each model takes about 560s
with Nvidia RTX 2080 Ti, and inference for 200 models finishes within 24 hours.
6.1 Datasets
We evaluate our proposed approach on a dataset of trigger infected models for classifying images
from MNIST and the public NIST-Round0 and NIST-Round1 datasets. We will refer to the dataset
of trigger infected MNIST classification models as Triggered MNIST dataset throughout. Code to
generate the triggered MNIST dataset was used from the TrojAI GitHub repo4. NIST datasets were
obtained from the TrojAI challenge website5.
Triggered MNIST Dataset: Two types of triggers, Type I and II (see Fig. 4) are inserted into each
image of clean MNIST dataset to generate Triggered data. A total of 900 models of 3 architectures
(ModdedBadNet, BadNet and ModdedLeNet5) are generated. Out of these, 300 were benign models,
300 were trained for any-to-any attack, and 300 were trained for any-to-one targeted attack. Details of
the models and their performance on clean and triggered data are given in the supplementary material.
NIST Datasets: The NIST datasets consist of traffic sign classification models (half benign and
half Trojaned) with 3 possible architectures (Inception-v3, DenseNet-121, and ResNet50). The
models were trained on synthetically created images of artificial traffic signs superimposed on road
background scenes. The Trojan infected models are poisoned with an unknown embedded trigger.
4https://github.com/trojai
5https://pages.NIST.gov/trojai/docs/data.html#download-links
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NIST-Round0 and NIST-Round1 datasets are both from the same distribution, the main difference
is that Round0 consists of 200 models, while Round1 dataset has 1,000 models. Details of the
models in the NIST datasets including their accuracy and attack success rates are provided in the
supplementary material. Clean data samples used to train the NIST models can be seen in Figure 5.
(b) Triggered MNIST (Trigger type II)(a) Triggered MNIST (Trigger type I)
Figure 4: Triggered MNIST dataset samples containing Type I triggers (a) and Type II triggers (b).
Class 0 Class 2Class 1 Class 3 Class 4
Figure 5: Clean image samples of 5 classes from the NIST datasets.
6.2 Results
In Table 1, we report the classification accuracy for a variety of training and test set model configu-
rations for the Triggered MNIST dataset. The classification accuracy is consistently high for both
Type I (93.3%) and Type II (91.7%) triggers. Even when training and test models are infected by
different types of triggers, the algorithm still has a high classification accuracy of 91.7% (or 90%)
which shows that our method is independent of trigger types. We achieve 94.4% performance for the
configuration where both trigger types are present, in equal proportions, in the training and test sets
(Table 1 last row).
Table 1: Trojan Detection results for the Triggered MNIST dataset of models. The proposed method
achieves good results even when trained on a trigger, which is different from the one seen at test time.
# Train Models Train Trigger # Test Models Test Trigger Accuracy
240 I 60 I 93.3± 1.6
240 II 60 II 91.7± 1.7
240 I 60 II 90.0± 1.2
240 II 60 I 91.7± 1.1
480 I, II 120 I, II 94.4± 1.2
NIST datasets are more challenging compared to Triggered MNIST, not only in terms of trigger types,
color and size of the data used to train the infected models, but also due to the fact that the NIST
models are much deeper. Our method obtains high classification accuracy of 92.5% for NIST-Round0
and 92.0% for NIST-Round1 datasets. Table 2 shows results of our method on the Triggered MNIST,
NIST Round0 and NIST Round1 datasets and compares them to Neural Cleanse [30]. Our proposed
Trojan Detection Network outperforms Neural Cleanse on all three datasets with large margins of
17.8%, 25% and 18% respectively. This can be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, it is difficult for
Neural Cleanse to find an optimal anomaly index threshold. Secondly, reverse engineering the trigger
does not perform well when the triggers are complex.
Table 2: Trojan detection accuracy on Triggered MNIST, NIST-Round0 & Round1 datasets.
Dataset
Method Triggered MNIST NIST-Round0 NIST-Round1
Neural Cleanse [30] 76.6± 1.2 67.5± 1.6 74.0± 1.4
Cassandra (Ours) 94.4± 1.2 92.5± 1.1 92.0± 1.3
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Table 3: Target Class Prediction Accuracy: Availability of P (Trojan) significantly increases the
target class prediction accuracy. All models are attacked any-to-one i.e. one target class per model.
Triggered MNIST NIST-Round0 NIST-Round1
without P (Trojan) 76.1± 1.5 72.5± 2.5 70.0± 1.0
with predicted P (Trojan) 90.0± 1.0 94.7± 1.7 88.1± 0.7
with ground truth P (Trojan) 95.0± 1.3 98.8± 1.4 91.7± 1.5
Table 3 shows our target class prediction results. The proposed two stage prediction algorithm based
on the attack difficulty and predicted P (Trojan) improves the classification accuracy significantly
over the baseline (without P (Trojan)) from 76.1%, 72.5% and 70.0% to 90.0%, 94.7% and 88.1%
on Triggered MNIST, NIST-Round0 and NIST-Round1 datasets respectively. Using Ground truth
P(Trojan) further improves classification accuracy which demonstrates attack difficulty is a critical
indicator of target class.
6.3 Ablation Study
Trojan Detector Network Modules: In Table 4, we explore different network architectures and the
functionality of individual modules of our method. Using only universal perturbations computed
from the complete training data of NIST-Round0, we achieved 77.5% classification accuracy. After
dividing the training data into 10 batches (these are different from the training mini-batches), we
generate 10 perturbations for each model. With these 10 perturbations, the accuracy improves to 85%.
Adding the attack difficulty further improves the classification accuracy in all cases. Finally, with
multi-batch and two stream architecture we achieve 92.5% classification accuracy.
Table 4: Effects of using multiple perturbations and attack difficulty. Trojan detection accuracy
on the NIST-Round0 validation data improves significantly after using multiple perturbations (n=10)
calculated from different batches of training data. Using L∞ and L2 perturbations in a two stream
architecture combined with attack difficulty (γ) further improves the accuracy.
Classification Accuracy
Input for classifier without γ with γ
L∞ perturbation from all training data 77.5± 2.1 82.5± 1.4
multi-batch L∞ perturbations 85.0± 1.8 90.0± 1.8
multi-batch + two stream (L∞ & L2) perturbations 85.0± 1.4 92.5± 1.1
Table 5: Effect of perturbation generator hyper-parameters on Trojan detection accuracy
L∞ Perturbation Magnitude (ξ∞/255)
ξ2/255 = 10, # L2 iterations = 10
# of Iterations 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1
5 87.5± 2.7 87.5± 1.4 90.0± 1.6 90.0± 1.4 90.0± 2.1
10 87.5± 1.7 90.5± 1.1 92.5± 1.4 92.5± 1.2 92.5± 1.1
15 90.0± 2.1 90.5± 1.3 90.0± 1.3 92.5± 2.1 92.5± 1.2
L2 Perturbation Magnitude (ξ2/255)
ξ∞/255 = 1, # L∞ iterations = 10
# of Iterations 5 10 20 30 40
5 87.5± 1.8 90.0± 1.4 90.0± 1.8 90.0± 1.2 90.0± 1.4
10 90.0± 1.4 92.5± 1.1 90.0± 1.4 92.0± 1.8 92.5± 1.1
15 90.0± 1.2 92.5± 1.1 92.5± 1.2 90.0± 1.3 92.5± 1.2
Universal Perturbation Generator Hyper-parameters: The choice of hyper-parameters may im-
pact on the effectiveness of the generated universal adversarial perturbations for various tasks.
However, our experiments show that the proposed method is robust to these parameters. We compare
the mean classification accuracy when using different number of iterations and magnitudes for L2
8
and L∞ bounded universal adversarial perturbations, and find that the Trojan detection accuracy
varies only slightly as shown in Table 5.
7 Conclusion
We proposed the first deep learning based method, that is trained on a large scale dataset of Trojaned
and clean models, for detecting Trojan infected models. We exploit the universal adversarial perturba-
tions to retrieve the fingerprints of Trojans in the DNNs and train our proposed TDN based on the
features of the perturbations and attack difficulty to discriminate benign and Trojaned models. We
also proposed simple variable, coined attack difficulty γ, to measure the energy needed to achieve
an average unit fooling rate. Based on the attack difficulty, we proposed a two stage target class
prediction method that can predict the target class of a Trojaned model in addition to the Trojan
probability. This provides further information on the type of malicious behaviour embedded in a
Trojan infected model e.g. which identity is being impersonated in a Trojaned face recognition model.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported in part under ARC Discovery Grant DP190102443. Xiaoyu Zhang and
Rohit Gupta were supported by University of Central Floria ORC fellowships.
References
[1] Hongming Chen, Ola Engkvist, Yinhai Wang, Marcus Olivecrona, and Thomas Blaschke. The
rise of deep learning in drug discovery. Drug discovery today, 23(6):1241–1250, 2018.
[2] Xiaoyu Zhang, Sheng Wang, Feiyun Zhu, Zheng Xu, Yuhong Wang, and Junzhou Huang.
Seq3seq fingerprint: towards end-to-end semi-supervised deep drug discovery. In Proceedings
of the 2018 ACM International Conference on Bioinformatics, Computational Biology, and
Health Informatics, pages 404–413, 2018.
[3] Yi Sun, Ding Liang, Xiaogang Wang, and Xiaoou Tang. Deepid3: Face recognition with very
deep neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1502.00873, 2015.
[4] Andreas Geiger, Philip Lenz, and Raquel Urtasun. Are we ready for autonomous driving?
the kitti vision benchmark suite. In 2012 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, pages 3354–3361. IEEE, 2012.
[5] Omar Javed and Mubarak Shah. Tracking and object classification for automated surveillance.
In European Conference on Computer Vision, pages 343–357. Springer, 2002.
[6] Naveed Akhtar and Ajmal Mian. Threat of adversarial attacks on deep learning in computer
vision: A survey. IEEE Access, 6:14410–14430, 2018.
[7] Xiaoyong Yuan, Pan He, Qile Zhu, and Xiaolin Li. Adversarial examples: Attacks and defenses
for deep learning. IEEE transactions on neural networks and learning systems, 30(9):2805–
2824, 2019.
[8] Florian Tramèr, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Dan Boneh, and Patrick
McDaniel. Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses. In International Conference
on Learning Representations, 2018.
[9] Yuntao Liu, Ankit Mondal, Abhishek Chakraborty, Michael Zuzak, Nina Jacobsen, Daniel Xing,
and Ankur Srivastava. A survey on neural trojans. In 2020 IEEE International Symposium on
Quality Electronics Design (ISQED), 2020.
[10] Yingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee, Juan Zhai, Weihang Wang, and Xiangyu
Zhang. Trojaning attack on neural networks. In 25nd Annual Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, NDSS 2018, San Diego, California, USA, February 18-221, 2018. The
Internet Society, 2018.
[11] Kevin Eykholt, Ivan Evtimov, Earlence Fernandes, Bo Li, Amir Rahmati, Chaowei Xiao, Atul
Prakash, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Dawn Song. Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning
visual classification. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, pages 1625–1634, 2018.
[12] Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, Bo Li, Kimberly Lu, and Dawn Song. Targeted backdoor attacks on
deep learning systems using data poisoning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.05526, 2017.
9
[13] T. Gu, K. Liu, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and S. Garg. Badnets: Evaluating backdooring attacks on deep
neural networks. IEEE Access, 7:47230–47244, 2019.
[14] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, Omar Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. Univer-
sal adversarial perturbations. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and
pattern recognition, pages 1765–1773, 2017.
[15] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Good-
fellow, and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In International Conference
on Learning Representations, 2014.
[16] Naveed Akhtar, Jian Liu, and Ajmal Mian. Defense against universal adversarial perturbations.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages
3389–3398, 2018.
[17] Valentin Khrulkov and Ivan Oseledets. Art of singular vectors and universal adversarial
perturbations. In The IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR),
June 2018.
[18] Naveed Akhtar, Jian Liu, and Ajmal Mian. Defense against universal adversarial perturbations.
In The IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), June 2018.
[19] Cihang Xie, Yuxin Wu, Laurens van der Maaten, Alan L Yuille, and Kaiming He. Feature
denoising for improving adversarial robustness. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages 501–509, 2019.
[20] Fangzhou Liao, Ming Liang, Yinpeng Dong, Tianyu Pang, Xiaolin Hu, and Jun Zhu. Defense
against adversarial attacks using high-level representation guided denoiser. In The IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), June 2018.
[21] Kathrin Grosse, Praveen Manoharan, Nicolas Papernot, Michael Backes, and Patrick McDaniel.
On the (statistical) detection of adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.06280, 2017.
[22] Dan Hendrycks and Kevin Gimpel. Early methods for detecting adversarial images. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1608.00530, 2016.
[23] Jan Hendrik Metzen, Tim Genewein, Volker Fischer, and Bastian Bischoff. On detecting
adversarial perturbations. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2017.
[24] Reuben Feinman, Ryan R Curtin, Saurabh Shintre, and Andrew B Gardner. Detecting adversarial
samples from artifacts. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.00410, 2017.
[25] Dongyu Meng and Hao Chen. Magnet: a two-pronged defense against adversarial examples.
In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 135–147, 2017.
[26] Jiajun Lu, Theerasit Issaranon, and David Forsyth. Safetynet: Detecting and rejecting adversarial
examples robustly. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision,
pages 446–454, 2017.
[27] Kang Liu, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg. Fine-pruning: Defending against
backdooring attacks on deep neural networks. In International Symposium on Research in
Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, pages 273–294. Springer, 2018.
[28] Bryant Chen, Wilka Carvalho, Nathalie Baracaldo, Heiko Ludwig, Benjamin Edwards, Taesung
Lee, Ian Molloy, and Biplav Srivastava. Detecting backdoor attacks on deep neural networks by
activation clustering. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.03728, 2018.
[29] Edward Chou, Florian Tramèr, Giancarlo Pellegrino, and Dan Boneh. Sentinet: Detecting
physical attacks against deep learning systems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.00292, 2018.
[30] Bolun Wang, Yuanshun Yao, Shawn Shan, Huiying Li, Bimal Viswanath, Haitao Zheng, and
Ben Y Zhao. Neural cleanse: Identifying and mitigating backdoor attacks in neural networks.
In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 707–723. IEEE, 2019.
[31] Huili Chen, Cheng Fu, Jishen Zhao, and Farinaz Koushanfar. Deepinspect: A black-box trojan
detection and mitigation framework for deep neural networks. In Proceedings of the 28th
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, pages 4658–4664, 2019.
[32] Xijie Huang, Moustafa Alzantot, and Mani Srivastava. Neuroninspect: Detecting backdoors in
neural networks via output explanations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.07399, 2019.
10
[33] Wenbo Guo, Lun Wang, Xinyu Xing, Min Du, and Dawn Song. Tabor: A highly accu-
rate approach to inspecting and restoring trojan backdoors in ai systems. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1908.01763, 2019.
[34] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. Deepfool: a simple
and accurate method to fool deep neural networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on
computer vision and pattern recognition, pages 2574–2582, 2016.
[35] Andrew Howard, Mark Sandler, Grace Chu, Liang-Chieh Chen, Bo Chen, Mingxing Tan,
Weijun Wang, Yukun Zhu, Ruoming Pang, Vijay Vasudevan, et al. Searching for mobilenetv3.
In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision, pages 1314–1324,
2019.
[36] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing ad-
versarial examples. In Yoshua Bengio and Yann LeCun, editors, 3rd International Conference
on Learning Representations, ICLR 2015, San Diego, CA, USA, May 7-9, 2015, Conference
Track Proceedings, 2015.
[37] Frank R Hampel. The influence curve and its role in robust estimation. Journal of the american
statistical association, 69(346):383–393, 1974.
Supplementary Material
TrojAI Leaderboard Results on NIST-Round0 Dataset
Figure 6 shows a snapshot of the TrojAI Leaderboard for NIST Round0 (see Section 7 for dataset
description). These results are compiled by the NIST server using a held-out test set not available
publicly. The snapshot was taken at 21:30 hours on 10 June 2020 and adjusted to fit on this page
without interfering with the results. We can see that Cassandra outperforms all other competitors by a
significant margin. The best results in terms of Cross-Entropy Loss and ROC-AUC for each method
are repeated in Table 6. Notice that we have the lowest loss and the highest ROC-AUC.
Figure 6: A snapshot of the TrojAI Leaderboard shows our method on top.
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Table 6: TrojAI Leaderboard results on NIST-Round0 dataset sorted by ROC (AUC). We have
included the best results in terms of Loss and ROC for our competitors. Best results in each column
are in bold. Note that we cannot access the F1 score, Precision and Recall for other methods.
Team Loss (Cross-Entropy) ROC (AUC) F1 Precision Recall
Cassandra 0.1601 0.9833 0.9746 0.9897 0.9600
UCF-XR 0.3149 0.9575 - - -
UCF-XR 0.2882 0.9563 - - -
IceTorch 0.2891 0.9320 - - -
IceTorch 0.2917 0.9275 - - -
MNIST Model Generation
Clean Model Generation
The data is split into training set : 60,000 images (6,000 images per class), and test set: 10,000
images (1,000 from each class). The clean data are used for training 300 benign/clean models with
three architecture types (ModdedBadnet, Badnet and ModdedLenet5net), each with 100 models (see
Table 7) .
Trojaned Model Generation
Clean Data: The MNIST dataset has 10 classes with 70,000 clean images (without triggers).
Triggered Data: Two types of triggers, Type I and Type II (see Figure in main paper) were inserted
into images of MNIST dataset. The Triggered MNIST data was combined with clean data to generate
Trojaned models. The following three data splits were used in our experiments:
Data split 1: training: 60,000 (triggered data: 10%), testing:10,000 (triggered data: 10%).
Data split 2: training: 60,000 (triggered data: 15%), testing:10,000 (triggered data: 15%).
Data split 3: training: 60,000 (triggered data: 20%), testing:10,000 (triggered data: 20%).
Models: In addition to the 300 benign models, another 600 Trojaned models of the same three
architectures (ModdedBadnet, Badnet and ModdedLenet5net) were generated. Trojaned models
were trained by the Triggered MNIST data and clean data where the proportion of triggered data
varied as 10%, 15% and 20%. Table 7 shows the details of both clean and infected models trained for
any-to-any Trojan attack. Any-to-one attack models were generated similar to any-to-any models.
300 Trojaned models were trained by any-to-any targeted attack, and another 300 were trained for
any-to-one targeted attack.
Evaluations of ModdedBadnet, Badnet and ModdedLeNet5 models are shown in Table 8 for any-
to-any attack and in Table 9 for any-to-one targeted attack. The clean models and Trojaned models
both have high classification accuracy when the test data is clean. The clean models also have
high classification accuracy when the test data is triggered. Since there is no Trojan in the clean
model, the triggered image samples are correctly classified. However, for the Trojaned models, the
classification accuracy (100 − Attack Success Rate) for triggered data is low since the triggered
images are misclassified. The tables show Attack Success Rates only for the triggered data which is
very high. These results imply that the Trojan (backdoor) was successfully inserted into the models.
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Table 7: Three models trained on Triggered MNIST dataset. Half the models are for any-to-any
attack and half are for any-to-one attack. For the latter case each model only has one target class.
Model name Model Architecture Trigger Triggered data #
ModdedBadNet 2 Conv + 1 Dense Type I, II 10%, 15% and 20% 100+100
BadNet 2 Conv + 2 Dense Type I, II 10%, 15% and 20% 100+100
ModdedLeNet5 3 Conv + 2 Dense Type I, II 10%, 15% and 20% 100+100
Table 8: Attack success rate and classification accuracy for three types of trojaned models (any-to-any
attack) for Triggered MNIST dataset. Success rate is the proportion of images for which predictions
by the Trojaned model is changed to an incorrect label.
Trojaned Model Clean Model
Attack Success Rate Classification Accuracy
Model Type Trigger I Trigger II Trigger I Trigger II
BadNet 98.7 98.7 98.9 99.0 99.1
ModdedBadNet 97.3 97.6 97.2 96.5 98.8
ModdedLeNet5net 97.8 98.6 98.0 97.3 98.7
Table 9: Attack success rate and classification accuracy for three types of trojaned models (any-to-one
targeted attack) on the Triggered MNIST dataset. Success rate is the proportion of images that
changed label to the target class for Trojaned model.
Trojaned Model
Attack Success Rate Classification Accuracy
Model Type Trigger I Trigger II Trigger I Trigger II
Badnet 99.1 99.0 98.8 98.9
ModdedBadnet 98.5 98.3 97.6 97.4
ModdedLenet5net 98.8 98.4 98.0 97.5
NIST Round0 and NIST Round1 Datasets
The NIST datasets consist of CNN classification models for traffic sign signals. Half of the models
are benign models and half are Trojaned models. The models have three architectures namely,
Inception-v3, DenseNet-121, and ResNet50. The models were trained on synthetically created image
data of artificial traffic signs superimposed on road background scenes. The Trojaned models have
been poisoned with triggers of different color, size and shape. Round0 dataset consists of 200 models,
while Round1 dataset has 1,000 models. NIST also holds a sequestered test dataset to evaluate
models. For that, models must be uploaded to the TrojAI Leaderboard website. Section 7 and Table 6
discuss our results on the TrojAI Leaderboard.
Table 10 and Table 11 show the model details and the performance of the three architecture types
present in the NIST Round0 and Round1 datasets. Notice that the Trojan infected models have
accuracy at par with the clean models and yet they have a very high attack success rate on the
triggered data.
Table 10: Attack success rate (for Trojan trigger infused data) and top-1 classification accuracy
(for clean data) for NIST-Round0 dataset. Success rate is the proportion of images for which the
prediction changes to the target label in Trojaned models.
Trojan Infected Model Clean Model
Model Type Attack Success Rate Classification Accuracy # models
DenseNet-121 99.82 99.76 99.90 63
Inception-v3 99.87 99.69 99.75 69
ResNet50 99.80 99.68 99.76 68
# models 100 100 200
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Table 11: Attack success rate (for Trojan trigger infused data) and top-1 classification accuracy (for
clean data) for three types of Trojaned and clean models from the NIST-Round1 dataset. Success rate
is the proportion of images for which the prediction changes to the target label in Trojaned models.
Trojan Infected Model Clean Model
Model Type Attack Success Rate Classification Accuracy # models
DenseNet-121 99.88 99.81 99.88 313
Inception-v3 99.84 99.85 99.89 250
ResNet50 99.58 99.81 99.83 437
# models 500 500 1000
Target Class Detection Algorithm
The procedure for target class prediction is given in Algorithm 1.
Data: Query model
Result: P (Trojan) and Target Class
Stage One: Use Trojan Detection network to get P (Trojan);
if P (Trojan) >= 0.5 then
for Ci ← 0 to C do
use FGSM to calculate adversarial perturbations with Ci as the target class;
compute attack difficulty (σi = L1NormFoolingRate ) for perturbation;
end
TargetClass = perform outlier detection over the attack difficulties σis;
output P (Trojan) and target class prediction;
else
output P (Trojan) and target class(None);
end
Algorithm 1: Two-stage method to detect a Trojan infected model and predict its target class using
only clean image samples.
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